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Global imbalances: 
the perspective of the Banco de México
Global imbalances (GIs) have been with us for quite some time. To a large extent, for many years they were 
disregarded by the world economic powers. Such imbalances provided fertile ground for a major ﬁ  nancial 
crisis to erupt. Regretfully, many of the policy measures implemented as a response to the crisis have 
exacerbated the damaging potential of GIs. The most recent manifestation of this is the rapid expansion 
of beggar-thy-neighbour policies that an uncoordinated policy response to GIs is leading to. Under this 
scenario, G20 policymakers should be alert and devote their efforts to search for possible agreed upon 
solutions to the underlying disequilibria; otherwise, we could be sowing the seeds for a new, potentially 




NB: I appreciate the comments and suggestions made by Manuel Ramos Francia and Miguel Diaz Diaz. The arguments presented here are solely the responsibility 
of the author. 
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G
lobal imbalances (GIs) are a very complex 
phenomenon resulting from the interaction 
of multiple factors. Globalisation of 
capital markets, a never-before-seen increase in 
consumption in the world’s largest economy, and 
the emergence of the most populated country as 
an economic power with the ability to produce vast 
amounts of goods  at very low costs are some of the 
main elements that allowed for the existence of 
such imbalances. GIs started more than a decade 
ago with the persistent current account deﬁ  cit in 
the United States and the consequent surplus in a 
number of countries, among which China stands out. 
Previously, the major concern resulting from this 
situation was the possibility of a rapid and disorderly 
reversal of the imbalances that could engulf the 
world in a crisis. Nowadays, the main preoccupation 
stems from the effects of the possible expansion of 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies to which the necessary 
correction of GIs is leading, in the context of a fully 
blown ﬁ  nancial crisis, which is still in the process 
of being resolved.
A question put forth frequently has been the extent 
to which GIs contributed to such a crisis. While there 
is no consensus on the role of GIs as a trigger of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, there seems to be some agreement 
regarding the existence of a profound interrelation 
between the two.
Before the crisis, the inexpensive and abundant ﬂ  ow 
of resources available in the US ﬁ  nancial system, 
characteristic of GIs, contributed to setting up 
the conditions necessary for the turmoil to erupt. 
These resources were allocated to the different sectors 
of the American economy, among them housing. 
The magnitude of such capital inﬂ  ows, combined 
with the now well-known handicaps in the regulation 
and supervision of ﬁ  nancial institutions, fueled a 
huge housing prices increase, which evolved into 
a “bubble”. This, together with an extremely active 
mortgage market, produced a large increase in the 
perceived wealth of the US population. 
The resulting housing price “bubble” in the 
United States led to an increase in consumption 
above the levels consistent with permanent income. 
Ex ante this situation was not worrisome as the 
increase in wealth was perceived to be permanent. 
However, ex post it became clear that the housing 
price increase was only temporary. Therefore, 
the higher consumption levels that US society got 
used to became unsustainable, as many households 
were left with large debts to repay without really 
having the capacity to do so. This is the current 
scenario for the United States, a situation in which a 
reduction in consumption levels  and patterns seems 
to be unavoidable; however, the way in which this 
adjustment will take place is uncertain due to its 
magnitude, the instruments available to harness it, 
and the political complications surrounding the issue.
A main element of the recent crisis is that it was 
global and shattered the stability of the entire 
ﬁ  nancial system, producing panic among investors. 
At the height of the crisis in late 2008 and early 
2009, capital ﬂ  owed to the United States as a result 
of paradoxical “flight to safety” considerations; 
paradoxical because as a result of such considerations 
resources ﬂ  owed to a country with a banking crisis, 
an expansionary ﬁ  scal policy, a lax monetary stance 
and large current account and ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits. It is 
difﬁ  cult to envisage capital ﬂ  owing into a country 
with such characteristics, but it did in the case of 
the United States, given its institutional strength, its 
wealth, and the perception that the US Government 
had sufﬁ  cient degrees of freedom to deal with the 
circumstances(as it has done so far). But these 
phenomena precluded a substantial real depreciation 
of the dollar, which would have eased the transition 
costs out of the crisis and would have contributed 
to alleviate the pressures coming from the GIs, 
as a matter of fact accelerating their correction. 
In this sense, the token capital ﬂ  ows switched off 
one of the main adjustment mechanisms to the GIs. 
In effect, historically it has been precisely an abrupt 
adjustment in the exchange rate which has been the 
main correction mechanism in those episodes where 
countries have accumulated unsustainable deﬁ  cits in 
the height of ﬁ  scal imbalances, monetary expansion, 
and a fully ﬂ  edged banking collapse. 
After the eruption of the crisis, GIs levels were 
signiﬁ  cantly reduced, but this seems to have been 
mostly a short-term response, given that trends are 
already returning to what they were before. This fact 
emphasises the importance of closely monitoring 
and studying current account balances and other 
aggregates to assess the measures that need to 
be taken to reduce the possible risks associated 
with them.
With respect to the parties on the other side of 
the imbalance, the three largest economies after 
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the United States (i.e. China, Germany and Japan) 
have had persistent current account surpluses for some 
time. However, China presents the most interesting 
case due to the international perception regarding the 
management of its currency derived from its growth 
strategy. Given this, it is reasonable to focus the 
discussion on China and the United States, although 
we ought to keep in mind that China is not alone as 
a counterpart to the huge US current account deﬁ  cit.
All in all, and even if it might sound surprising, 
the fundamentals of the Chinese economy are 
supportive of a relatively depreciated real exchange 
rate. In particular, high precautionary savings 
related to the lack of social safety nets, a foreign 
reserve strategy based on acquiring US Treasury 
securities inﬂ  uenced by the underdevelopment of 
the Chinese ﬁ  nancial system, and a very abundant 
and elastic labor supply −with the consequent low 
real wages− resulting from migration patterns from 
rural areas to production centers, all contribute to 
the compression of absorption, and therefore, to a 
relatively depreciated real exchange rate.
Under these circumstances, the way to address GIs 
is by fostering structural reforms aimed at reducing 
the underlying deﬁ  ciencies of countries like China 
that limit exchange rate ﬂ  exibility. The creation 
of social safety nets and the development of its 
ﬁ  nancial system could reduce Chinese savings levels 
and the dependency on US Treasury securities as 
the principal source of risk-free assets. Along the 
same lines, China could also allow for the ﬂ  ow of 
reserve money to sectors that have been closed and 
are underdeveloped, easing the direct downward 
pressure on the exchange rate and creating the 
real sources of development without the need of a 
constantly undervalued real exchange rate.
As a matter of fact, the need for more exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility among G20 economies stems from 
the conviction that it would lead to a less costly 
adjustment of GIs in terms of global growth and 
ﬁ  nancial volatility. The necessary consumption 
adjustment in the United States due to households’ 
deleveraging process and the complicated situation 
in its labor market imply possible deflationary 
risks. However, a deflationary process in an 
economy with high leverage levels would only 
compound the problem. This complex situation 
makes understandable the implementation of an 
extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy 
by the US Federal Reserve. Regretfully, this is 
nevertheless producing unintended consequences 
worldwide. Precisely because of this, more exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility in some Asian economies, and in 
China in particular, is urgently needed, since it would 
lead to a situation where the degree for monetary 
accommodation in advanced economies would be 
reduced.
In the recent past, investment in emerging market 
economies has become more attractive for several 
reasons. Among these are the higher rates of growth 
in such countries, the fact that they are coming 
out of the crisis without any signiﬁ  cant structural 
damage, and also that they have more degrees of 
freedom regarding the potential implementation of 
policies geared towards stimulating growth. However, 
this relative attractiveness of emerging economies 
has been compounded by the aggressive monetary 
expansion in the United States. As a result, there has 
been a massive increase in the ﬂ  ow of resources to 
these countries. This by itself could be a good sign. 
However, the speed and amounts at which capital 
is inﬂ  owing can represent destabilising forces, and 
have generated concern among some export-driven 
economies whose currencies are appreciating in real 
terms to the detriment of their export sectors. In this 
context, it is important to differentiate among those 
countries whose currencies have been appreciating 
due to underlying structural phenomena and those 
that are suffering mainly due to the abnormally lax 
monetary policy stance in advanced economies, 
mainly in the United States.
Increased capital ﬂ  ows can be a powerful force towards 
development; however, to get the most out of them 
it is necessary to differentiate between those capital 
ﬂ  ows that arrive in search of long-term projects and 
those short-term resources that simply are attracted 
due to lax monetary conditions elsewhere. In this 
sense, it is important for emerging economies to 
generate incentives to drive ﬂ  ows towards productive 
long-term projects, and reduce incentives for ﬂ  ows 
that could result in an unwarranted increase in 
domestic consumption. To do this, it is necessary 
for those countries to open up and allow investment 
ﬂ  ows into sectors that are presently restricted, so as to 
reap the full potential of the increased capital ﬂ  ows.
Some countries are using the potential negative 
externalities produced by rapid and massive capital 
inﬂ  ows to justify the introduction of taxes and other 
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controls applicable on them, as well as interventionist 
exchange rates policies. Such reactions, in 
combination with the lax monetary policies in the 
advanced economies, threaten the long-term ﬁ  nancial 
stability and growth of the world economy by placing 
it on the verge of a currency-trade predicament in 
which no one wins. This is the case because while 
the policies used are implemented to solve short-term 
issues, they impose long-term distortions on the 
economy, hurting activity. Additionally, the efﬁ  cacy 
of these policies is limited due to the increasingly 
global nature of capital markets. The trend towards 
restrictions on capital ﬂ  ows, trade barriers, and even 
“currency wars” reminds us of a protectionist era that 
we have fought hard to put behind us.
It is important to highlight the fact that those 
countries that resist joining these practices are more 
likely to incur short-run costs, although they are also 
more likely to receive future beneﬁ  ts derived from 
stable capital ﬂ  ows and the avoidance of introducing 
major distortions to their economies. In this 
sense, policymakers are faced with a short-term 
versus long-term conundrum in which making 
decisions is not simple. A close look at past 
experiences has shown that focusing on the long run 
has been more fruitful; nevertheless, circumstances 
might force the broad adoption of undesired policy 
actions if the pressures become overwhelming. 
Let us just hope that if these measures are applied, 
they are done so in the least harmful way possible.
All in all then, I believe that it is urgent for the world 
to move to a scenario with higher policy coordination 
among countries. Of course this means paying more 
than lip service to shared responsibilities. On the 
one hand, surplus countries should put in place 
structural policies conducive to more appreciated 
equilibrium real exchange rates. On the other hand, 
deﬁ  cit countries should implement policies that are 
consistent with more depreciated equilibrium real 
exchange rates, that is, policies that recognise that 
domestic absorption needs to be at levels that are 
sustainable and not policies that could have very 
adverse externalities for most countries and that in 
the end will probably only postpone the adjustments 
that need to take place anyway. 
At the international level, this policy discussion can 
be compared with a regular prisoner’s dilemma. 
While staying put achieves a more efﬁ  cient outcome, 
incentives are such that individual movements are 
desirable for each player but together can imply 
collective ruin. In this sense, policymakers in 
the G20 countries must place enough emphasis 
on the repeated nature of the game pursuing the 
more efﬁ  cient equilibrium by inducing countries 
to cooperate. 
Wrapping up, it could be asserted that GIs generated fertile ground for the ﬁ  nancial crisis to erupt. 
When it materialised, it destabilised the global ﬁ  nancial sector, which in turn has had signiﬁ  cant effects 
on the growth prospects of the main advanced economies. Furthermore, sluggish growth rates observed 
after the turmoil generated incentives for policymakers to try to induce growth through a broad range of 
expansionary policies. A scenario in which GIs are not corrected can make matters worse for the global 
economy. Some sources of concern along these lines are the fact that some developed countries have 
larger and increasing  public debt derived from onerous stimulus packages and bailout costs, and that 
policies are increasingly distorting capital ﬂ  ows and monetary conditions with the intention (sometimes 
veiled) of getting an edge on other countries. Under this scenario, policymakers should be alert and 
searching for creative solutions to these new conditions; otherwise, we could be sowing the seeds for a 
new, potentially more harmful and devastating crisis.
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